Oscar Baptiste v. Attorney General United States by unknown
2020 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
3-31-2020 
Oscar Baptiste v. Attorney General United States 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2020 
Recommended Citation 
"Oscar Baptiste v. Attorney General United States" (2020). 2020 Decisions. 319. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2020/319 
This March is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2020 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
  
BLD-153        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 19-3371 
___________ 
 
OSCAR BAPTISTE, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2:18-cv-16826) 
District Judge:  Honorable Kevin McNulty 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Summary Action 
Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
March 26, 2020 
Before:  AMBRO, GREENAWAY, Jr., and BIBAS, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: March 31, 2020) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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 Oscar Baptiste, a citizen of Panama, appeals pro se from an order of the United 
States District Court for the District of New Jersey granting the Government’s motion to 
dismiss an action which sought to challenge the denial of his applications for 
naturalization.  For the following reasons, we will grant the Government’s motion to 
summarily affirm the District Court’s order. 
 Baptiste entered the United States on a B-2 visitor visa in January 2001 and 
adjusted his status to lawful permanent resident in October 2003.  In July 2007, Baptiste 
filed a naturalization application.  Following a hearing, the United States Citizenship and 
Immigration Services (USCIS) denied that application on July 31, 2008, on the ground 
that Baptiste lacked good moral character.  That conclusion was based on the 
consequences of Baptiste’s arrest on domestic violence charges.  In particular, the USCIS 
cited the fact that the “record reveals that there is a protective order issued against you 
and the court has placed you in the Family Violence Program.”   
Several years later, Baptiste was arrested, convicted, and sentenced on federal 
drug charges.  See 21 U.S.C. §§ 952 and 960(b)(2)(B)(ii) (cocaine importation).  After 
completing his sentence, Baptiste was taken into immigration custody and charged with 
removability for having been convicted of an aggravated felony as defined in 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1101(a)(43)(B) (illicit trafficking in a controlled substance), 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), and for having been convicted of a controlled substance offense, 8 
U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i).  An Immigration Judge found that Baptiste was removable and 
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the Board of Immigration Appeals dismissed his appeal, holding that it lacked 
jurisdiction over his challenge to the denial of his first naturalization application.  
Baptiste filed a petition for review, which we denied.  Baptiste v. Att’y Gen., 776 F.3d 
94, 97 (3d Cir. May 23, 2019) (not precedential) (holding, inter alia, that “BIA properly 
held that it lacked jurisdiction to consider Baptiste’s challenge to the USCIS’s 2008 
denial of his naturalization application”).     
Meanwhile, a few months before his arrest, Baptiste had filed a second 
naturalization application.  Because no substantive action had been taken on that 
application as of November 2018, Baptiste filed a mandamus petition in United States 
District Court for the District of New Jersey, seeking to compel the USCIS to adjudicate 
the application or to have the District Court declare that he is a United States citizen.  
While that petition was pending, the USCIS denied Baptiste’s second naturalization 
application in an order dated February 14, 2019.  The Government filed a motion to 
dismiss.  The District Court granted that motion, explaining that this Court had denied 
Baptiste’s petition for review “in terms that dispose of many or most of the issues” raised 
in his mandamus petition.  Baptiste appealed.  After Baptiste filed his pro se brief, the 
Government moved for summary affirmance.  Baptiste opposes the motion summary 
affirmance.   
 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we exercise plenary 
review over the order granting the Government’s motion to dismiss.  See Free Speech 
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Coal., Inc. v. Att’y Gen., 677 F.3d 519, 529-30 (3d Cir. 2012).  We may summarily 
affirm if the appeal presents no substantial question. See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6. 
See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.   
 There is no dispute that Baptiste is not presently entitled to be naturalized.  To be 
eligible, an individual must show that he has maintained good moral character until being 
admitted to citizenship.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a)(3); Boatswain v. Gonzales, 414 F.3d 
413, 416 (2d Cir. 2005).  Baptiste’s aggravated felony conviction prevents him from 
making that showing.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(8); Al-Sharif v. U.S. Citizenship & 
Immigration Servs., 734 F.3d 207, 214 (3d Cir. 2013) (en banc).  He asserted, therefore, 
that his naturalization applications should be considered nunc pro tunc as if he were not 
an aggravated felon.  In making that argument, Baptiste claimed that the USCIS 
“unreasonably and arbitrarily delayed” the processing of his naturalization applications. 
 Baptiste’s argument in foreclosed by our decision in Duran-Pichardo v. Attorney 
General, 695 F.3d 282, 288 (3d Cir. 2012).  Like Baptiste, the petitioner in Duran-
Pichardo had commenced naturalization proceedings, but then committed an aggravated 
felony before the application was adjudicated.  The petitioner, who was subject to a final 
order of removal, argued that he was entitled to nunc pro tunc review of his naturalization 
application as if he were still eligible for citizenship.  We rejected that argument, noting 
that a court may not grant equitable relief in contravention of the expressed intent of 
Congress, id. at 288 (citing Cheruku v. Att’y Gen., 662 F.3d 198, 209 (3d Cir. 2011)), 
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and the Immigration and Nationality Act expressly prohibits the naturalization of any 
person against whom a final order of removal has been entered, see id. at 288 (citing 8 
U.S.C. § 1429).  Therefore, we held that “[e]quitable relief is unavailable if it would 
require agency review of an alien’s naturalization application while that alien is the 
subject of an outstanding finding of deportability or a pending removal proceeding.”  Id. 
at 288.  Because Baptiste is subject to a final order of removal, he is not entitled to nunc 
pro tunc review of his naturalization application, for the reasons that we expressed in 
Duran-Pichardo.       
Baptiste also argues that “the denial [of his first naturalization application] was 
based on an incorrect assessment of the facts underlying his state court [domestic 
violence] case that are not supported by the record.”  Mandamus Pet., 11; see also 
Appellant’s Br., 19.  For example, he characterizes the protective order entered against 
him as “partial” because it was issued by the police upon his release, rather than by a 
court.  See Appellant’s Opp’n to Mot. for Summ. Affirmance, 5.  He also claims that he 
was not “placed” in the “Family Violence Program,” but rather entered voluntarily.  
Appellant’s Br., 9.  These arguments, however, should have first been made in a timely 
appeal to an immigration officer.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1447(a); 8 C.F.R. § 336.2(a).  Because 
Baptiste did not pursue such an appeal, the District Court could not review Baptiste’s 
challenge to the denial of his first naturalization application.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1421(c) 
(authorizing judicial review of the denial of a naturalization application “after a hearing 
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before an immigration officer”); Escaler v. U.S. Citizen and Immigration Servs., 582 F.3d 
288, 292 (2d Cir. 2009) (holding that § 1421(c) “requires the exhaustion of administrative 
remedies prior to seeking” judicial review).  Baptiste argues that he should be excused 
from the exhaustion requirement because, sometime prior to July 31, 2008, an 
“immigration official instructed [him] to ignore any denial letter he may receive from 
USCIS.”1  Appellant’s Br., 8 n.13.  But, even assuming that we could excuse the statutory 
exhaustion requirement, see Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 n.6 (2001), such relief 
would not be warranted here because Baptiste did not act diligently in pursuing this 
claim.  Cf. Harrow v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 279 F.3d 244, 250 (3d Cir. 2002) 
(stating that plaintiff’s diligence in pursuing administrative relief is a factor in 
determining whether to excuse exhaustion under ERISA).   
For the foregoing reasons, we grant the Government’s motion for summary 
affirmance and will affirm the District Court’s judgment.  
 
1 The Government notes, however, that the USCIS’s letter notifying Baptiste of the denial 
of his 2007 naturalization application clearly stated that he could request an 
administrative review hearing within 30 days and that, if he did not do so, the decision 
would be final.   
